


JPRS-TAC-93-008

21 April 1993



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-93-008

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JAPAN

UN Sponsors Disarmament Conference in Kyoto

Attendees Cited

LD1304064993 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
0551 GMT 13 Apr 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Andrey Varlamov]

[Text] Tokyo April 13 (TASS)—A four-day international conference on disarmament problems opened in Kyoto, Japan, today under the U.N. aegis. The topic of the conference is "Disarmament and Security Problems in the Interdependent World".

Some 90 statesmen, scientists and experts from 37 countries are taking part in this influential forum. Russia is represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The U.N. leadership is represented at the Kyoto conference by Stoyan Ganev, chairman of the 47th U.N. General Assembly session, and Vladimir Petrovsky, director of the U.N. office in Geneva.

Chairman of the U.N. Committee for Disarmament Pravoslav Davinic made a report at the conference, highlighting some important aspects of the problem of maintaining global security, specifically, the stabilisation of the situation on the territory of the former USSR and the termination of the civil war in Yugoslavia. He stressed that the current conference was of much practical importance especially for the Asia-Pacific region. In his opinion, one of its tasks is to work out methods of and approaches to the multilateral collective solution of regional problems, in the first place.

According to Davinic, the end of the "cold war" unfortunately affected the world situation in a negative way too, giving a new dimension to the overall state of instability, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. In this connection he mentioned a number of important problems which are typical of the region, for instance, territorial and border disputes, domestic conflicts, as well as "non-military" problems which are not linked directly with disarmament, but which are important for ensuring security in the Asia-Pacific region, specifically drug trafficking and the migration of refugees.

Parliamentary Deputy Foreign Minister of Japan Koji Kakizawa, who also spoke at the conference, called attention to the situation on the Korean peninsula following North Korea's announcement of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. North

Korea, which had taken part in the two previous U.N. disarmament conferences, this time did not send its representative to Kyoto. Koji Kakizawa urged Pyongyang to revise its decision, because it may lead to the escalation of tension in the region.

Koji Kakizawa mentioned the problem of arms trade and suggested that the countries which are expanding their arms export capacities, should work out an effective system of control over that type of exports.

UN Official Suggests New Organization

OW1604100993 Tokyo *KYODO in English* 0948 GMT
16 Apr 93

[Text] Tokyo, April 16 *KYODO*—A high-ranking United Nations official on Friday [16 April] suggested the creation of an intercontinental organization linking the Asia-Pacific region with Europe and North America to promote disarmament.

Vladimir Petrovskiy, newly appointed director general of the UN office in Geneva, said that Japan's participation in such a disarmament group is crucial for its success.

"This kind of organization should be open and interrelated," he explained in an interview. "And the participation of Japan is of tremendous importance because it provides the link with the Pacific region."

Petrovskiy, a former UN undersecretary general for political affairs, made the remarks after attending a UN Disarmament conference in Kyoto as emissary of UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

The idea of an intercontinental disarmament organization, he said, stems in part from Japan's participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and is part of UN "Preventive diplomacy."

But in the short run, Petrovskiy said, some disarmament specialists are interested in closer ties between existing European institutions and Asia-Pacific groups such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

Petrovskiy, a former first deputy foreign minister of the now defunct Soviet Union, said members of the world community face what he called "post-disarmament agreement (PDA) problems," such as the transportation, storage and destruction of nuclear weapons and other weapons and the retraining of demilitarized armies.

GENERAL

Ukrainian Nuclear Issue Discussed

Kravchuk Disputes Ownership of Weapons

OW1604173993 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1727 GMT 16 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In his interview to the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY weekly President Leonid Kravchuk dismissed reports alleging that the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil are not properly maintained and stored as "crude lies." The president said that in his country the silos are "in no worse shape than they are in Russia."

Kravchuk reiterated his position that Ukraine does not desire to become a nuclear state. Still, he did not agree that the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine are Russian property. "It is the property of the CIS," he insisted.

Kravchuk called for dividing the Black Sea fleet between former Soviet countries having access to the sea. Russia, he said, wants to divide the coastal services, communication hardware, etc. as well as the navy ships. Kiev objects to this approach, Kravchuk said. Like Russia, his country is very sensitive when its territorial integrity is at stake.

Party Leader Says Guarantees Needed

LD1704030693 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1000 GMT 16 Apr 93

[Text] Ukraine desires non-nuclear status, but it should receive security guarantees before disarming. This was stated by Vitaliy Zhuravskyy, chairman of the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine, during a meeting in Washington today with representatives from the Pentagon, the Senate, and President Clinton's administration. Zhuravskyy is in the United States at the invitation of the Democratic Party of that country and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

U.S. Ambassador Cited

OW1504200093 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1923 GMT 15 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] If Ukraine fails to resolve the issue of nuclear weapons deployed on its territory it may find itself in isolation from the rest of the international community, U.S. ambassador in Kiev Roman Popadiuk said in Kiev Thursday [15 April].

He said his country was ready to spend about \$9 Bn. [billion] on enriched uranium contained in the warheads of nuclear missiles owned by nuclear states of the former Soviet Union. At the same time, said the ambassador, Washington would not strike a nuclear deal with

Moscow until after the question of who exactly owned the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine had been resolved.

On Ukraine's demand for compensation for the dismantling of nuclear weapons, Popadiuk said the U.S. had agreed to allocate \$175 Mn [million] for the purpose but Ukrainian leaders put the cost from \$1.5 to 2.5 Bn. later.

The ambassador also said Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma was due to visit the U.S. soon. He denied allegations that U.S. President Bill Clinton was refusing to meet Kuchma unless Ukraine ratified the Start-I [as received] agreement. Washington wanted to see the ratification of and Ukraine's joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty take place simultaneously, Popadiuk said.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Russia's Khasbulatov Voices Criteria for SALT II Ratification

Treaty Must be 'Submitted' by Foreign Minister

OW1304105993 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1015 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian parliament's chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov has stressed that a major condition for the SALT-2 [as received] to be ratified is that "it must be submitted by a foreign minister, enjoying respect in society." "As long as there is no such minister," he rules out the possibility of the SALT-2 ratification by the Russian parliament. Khasbulatov declared this, answering questions at a meeting with war and labour veterans in the parliamentary center on 13 April.

Speaking about a referendum, he voiced fear that there are no full guarantees against fraud at the plebiscite. In his opinion, public control is essential for the count of votes. The speaker emphasized that he did not intend to be a candidate in the next elections and was ready to return to scientific work.

Asked about the parliament's law-making activity, Khasbulatov remarked that it was hindered by "a significant group of deputies, linked to the executive power and to the lobbying executive structures." The speaker suggested calling off the deputies, who "fight against Parliamentarism and who campaign for dissolving the parliament." In his opinion, these lawmakers must move to executive structures.

Assessing the outcome of the presidential elections in Kalmykia, Khasbulatov called on the audience to ponder the question of "who had brought the billionaire Kirsan Ilyumzhinov to the presidency." Drawing a parallel to the Chechen president Johar Dudayev, he reported that

he had evidence, according to which Poltoranin and Burbulis had been involved in bringing Dudayev to power.

Khasbulatov explained the abolition of the presidency in Mordovia by President Guslyannikov's [name as received] personal qualities: "He is either taken pity on or laughed at in the republic." "The Russian president's decree concerning the latest events in Mordovia, as the parliament's speaker believes, embodies a policy to dismember the Russian Federation." Boris Yeltsin, in his view, should not interfere in this situation.

Further Report

LD1304162693 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1542 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Text] Moscow, 13 Apr—Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov has stated that the START-2 Treaty should be presented to parliament by a foreign minister who is worthy of the respect and trust of society. "Until there is such a minister, I think it is simply absurd to talk about the START-2 Treaty," he said, speaking at a meeting of World War II veterans, members of the militia, and trade unions today. This was reported in the newspaper *IZVESTIYA* today.

IZVESTIYA pointed out that such an appeal is unparalleled with respect to a treaty upon which the fate of mankind depends. Having stated that the resignation of Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev is a preface to the ratification of the treaty by Russia's parliament, Khasbulatov "was not simply broadening the framework of his powers. He essentially issued the partner in the talks with an ultimatum. He has distinctly threatened the United States with wrecking an extremely important agreement," *IZVESTIYA* stressed.

Linkage of START II, Kozyrev Ouster Scored

PM1304175193 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
14 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Vladimir Nadein report: "Our Speaker Finally Puts U.S. Congress in Its Place"]

[Text] Addressing a meeting Tuesday morning of World War II, militia, and trade union veterans who had been selected by his apparatus, R.I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, attempted to win over the Washington White House, Capitol Hill—where the U.S. Congress is in session—and all the world's peace-loving public interested in the ratification of the START II Treaty.

Answering a question about the prospects for ratification of this treaty, which was signed by Presidents B. Yeltsin and G. Bush this January, the leader of the country's main soviet said: "First and foremost this treaty should be submitted (to the Russian Supreme Soviet) by a foreign minister who is worthy of society's respect and confidence. Until we get such a minister I think it will be simply absurd to talk about the START II Treaty."

Accusations require no proof within the terms of reference of the propaganda campaign which Khasbulatov is currently waging against the president. The laws of chivalry pertaining to duels do not apply to a war of destruction. That is why few will be surprised by Khasbulatov's attack at the same meeting: "The people standing in the way of the reforms are the president himself and his government, which are incapable of carrying out the reforms."

This text is cited in reverse translation from the English supplied by the REUTER wire service. Translated back from Soviet language into ordinary speech, it means he himself is an idiot.

It is unprecedented to take such an attitude toward a treaty on which the fate of mankind depends. The threefold reduction in the nuclear potential of Russia and the United States is designed for the decade ahead and intended to yield considerable benefits only in the next millennium. Very many people in Russia justifiably hope that neither the Congress of People's Deputies nor the current Supreme Soviet will make it past the year 2000.

By stating that Foreign Minister Kozyrev's resignation is a precondition for ratification of the treaty by the Supreme Soviet Khasbulatov has not merely arbitrarily and infinitely expanded the bounds of his powers. He has essentially delivered an ultimatum to our negotiating partner. He has clearly threatened the United States with the collapse of a most important agreement. And simultaneously pointed the way toward a nonnuclear world—namely, by removing Kozyrev. Or, if the worst comes to the worst, by demoting him.

Lord, to think that the fate of mankind can sometimes hang on things like this!

Although this kind of linkage of the world's future to immediate cadre interests sounds like a bad joke, it cannot be wholly disregarded. Our parliament is able to make fairy tales come true. It could up and pass a decree to halt nuclear disarmament until a total and final victory over Kozyrev is won. And, if necessary, it could change the Constitution too.

Khasbulatov's latest initiative is hardly likely to make anyone on Capitol Hill blanch. Both the Democratic majority and the Republican minority will just shrug their shoulders. It is all right for them. They do not have to answer the referendum questions.

Russian Comments on START II Implementation

USA Institute Scholar Raises Questions

93WC0049A Moscow *MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI*
in Russian No 10, 7 Mar 93 p 14a

[Article by Irina Zhinkina, research associate of the Russian Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute, under the "Opinion" rubric: "START II: Other Side of the Coin"]

[Text] It is essential to correlate the versions of a reduction in nuclear and other arms, however beneficial they may seem from the military and political viewpoints, with the state's possibilities for realizing them.

It would be appropriate to recall this during discussion of the strong and weak aspects of the START II Treaty also inasmuch as the scale of the reductions is unprecedented.

The first problem which the Russian state will encounter is that of verification. Does Russia possess at this time sufficient technical means, space-based chiefly, for permanent, global, and operational verification of this large-scale treaty?

Two facts should be noted here. The first is that the uniform system of observation from space has lost part of its ground complexes on account of the disintegration of the USSR. The second is that verification of compliance with the START II Treaty would prevent the use in full of military space-based facilities in the civilian sectors.

On-site inspections play an important part in the verification of a reduction in nuclear arms together with national technical means. In the course of realization of the INF Treaty alone the Soviet Union dispatched approximately 300 inspection teams, the United States, approximately 600.

The broad-based reduction in strategic nuclear arms will require an increase in expenditure on this method of verification or the other: the number of facilities to be inspected will grow immeasurably. Can our budget "hack" such a growth of spending, and to what will it amount?

It could be assumed, say, that we trust the Americans to such an extent that we would not inspect. But verification is important not only as a guarantee of security but also as a political instrument. For this reason it is essential from the economic and political viewpoint to resolve the problem of verification prior to ratification of the treaty. An adjustment of the timeframe of its realization will possibly be required.

The second problem not lending itself to speedy resolution is the availability of the production and research base for dismantling the complexes which are to be stood down, for refitting the remaining ones and, finally, for utilizing or destroying the diverse components of nuclear weapons. It is clear that this area of realization of the START II Treaty also will require additional efforts and outlays.

As distinct from the Americans, we cannot as yet make a full judgment as to the economic costs of each version of reductions in nuclear or conventional arms and cannot compare them in terms of cost indicators or their complexity and interdependence with other methods of assuring security. And without this it is impossible to judge the practicability of fulfillment of the treaty and the optimum timeframe and pace of the reductions. In

addition, our military industry should work not only for disarmament but also ensure the day-to-day activity of the system of security under the new conditions, which are changing rapidly, what is more.

The third aspect is organizational. It is a question of who will assume responsibility for realization of the terms of the START II Treaty and of who could draw up a state program and allocate resources efficiently and also monitor their expenditure. Will it not be the case that no one will be held to account for noncompliance with the terms and timeframe of the treaty?

Financial and organizational difficulties will be among the main ones, by all accounts.

In the face of these all arguments about the role of nuclear weapons, a sufficient quantity of nuclear munitions, and the effectiveness of "deterrence" could become utterly meaningless, in the same way that talk about the environmental danger of nuclear power stations pales with the onset of an energy crisis.

Considering this, discussion of the treaty and the adoption of a decision should, perhaps, be postponed even for a length of time determined by the president or the Supreme Soviet. The interested parties (the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, sectoral departments, and others) could within this period justify their proposals pertaining to realization of the treaty, which, following coordination, they would be prepared to regard as their own commitments. As a result of this work, in which it would be expedient enlisting extradepartmental research outfits also, the Supreme Soviet and the president would have two or three alternative programs.

It cannot be ruled out that as a result the optimum decision would be found on the basis of a self-sufficient program of a reduction, independent of the United States, emanating exclusively from the intra-economic and sociopolitical situation in Russia. Given the appropriate diplomatic approach of our Foreign Ministry, Russian-American relations would not suffer, it would seem. The United States would in such a case essentially always proceed from its own interests. Everyone understands to what extent they now differ from ours. And were the Russian leadership to formulate its position definitively and confirm its commitment to a policy of radical reductions in the nuclear potential, reserving for itself a greater freedom of choice of versions of reductions and the pace thereof, it would ultimately be closer to the goal inasmuch as it would be assuming practicable commitments.

Committee Deputy Chairman Calls Treaty Inequitable

934C0047A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 1 Apr 93 p 5

[Interview with I. Andronov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, by

Vladimir Ryabokon; place and date not given: "We Lose Just About Everything, They Keep Just About Everything"]

[Text] My interviewee—Iona Andronov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee—emphasizes his political neutrality in every possible way. He at the same time remains, he says, the same person he was when elected immediately following the First Congress of People's Deputies, that is, when the Soviet Union was still in existence.

Our interview concerns the possible timeframe of ratification of the SOA-2 Treaty or, as it is still called, START. There is no doubt that on 3 and 4 April, during the summit, both Yeltsin and Clinton will return repeatedly to a detailed discussion thereof.

Ryabokon: How can you explain the difficulties which the ratification of the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty has encountered in the Supreme Soviet?

Andronov: I believe that this is explained by the fact that the treaty contains provisions of its fulfillment which are disadvantageous to Russia, place Russia in an absolutely unequal position in relation to the United States, and which, in my opinion, are even dangerous for other countries because, if this treaty is fulfilled as recorded, the United States will become simply some unbounded, limitless master of the whole world. It could after this simply dictate its will to whoever it likes and however it likes. This would be a great American empire.

Ryabokon: What precisely is meant by the fact that this treaty is more advantageous to the United States than Russia? Do you not think that there is here simply a political aspect profitable to certain forces within Russia?

Andronov: Perhaps this element is present, but not for my part. Do you know that our pseudo-democratic press is a representative of the implacable opposition? I have never belonged to the opposition nor do I belong to any party, any political group, or any parliamentary faction. I am politically independent, if I may put it this way.

But you should know that the treaty was prepared in an atmosphere of secrecy. This is all the more odd in that this was not a treaty of two great powers aimed against someone else, against third countries, against some other grouping. There might then have been some explanation for this secrecy. This treaty, according to its authors who took part in the negotiations, is to ensure general peace for a very long time. So what was the point of classifying and concealing here?

Now as for the arguments. We are dealing with a very complex subject here, of course, and it is not a question here of Andronov simply digging his heels in, like a ram, you understand, and of his being opposed for some reason or other. This is not the case. Let us clarify at once: Andronov is not opposed to the treaty, I am for this treaty, I am for its ratification, I am for nuclear

disarmament, only not in the form where Russia is brought to its knees before the United States and where the United States will subsequently dictate to the world everything it pleases. Both parties will destroy all ground-based missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles, but those deployed on submarines will be retained in the quantity which the Americans need to preserve their present nuclear arsenal. This is the whole point—and this is what the public does not know. Eighty percent of the arsenal of the Soviet Union is composed of ground-based missiles, and we have only 20 percent on submarines. But with the Americans it is exactly the other way about, that is, we lose just about everything, they keep just about everything.

Those who on our side prepared this treaty for signing and have palmed it off on the president have simply organized Russia's nuclear surrender. You don't like this version? Well then, certainly, effect the same proportion as the Americans have currently. But this would cost hundreds of billions of rubles. We are not up to maintaining this formidable arsenal even now.

Legislator Fears 'Re-Arming Race'

OW1604192493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1900 GMT 16 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At a press conference on Friday [16 April] in Moscow Deputy of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Coordinator of Faction Fatherland, General Lieutenant Genadiy Benov declared that the START-2 Treaty "is drawing" Russia not into reduction of armed forces but into a "nuclear re-arming race." He indicated that it would be better for Russia to unilaterally disarm "according to those rates and directions which correspond to its interests" than to sign the START-2 Treaty.

In accordance with this document, Benov asserts, Russia will be forced to change the structure of its strategic offensive forces, making it analogous to the Americans. Ground based ICBMs, including silo-based ICBMs, constitute 20% of the American and 60% of the Russian strategic offensive forces. "Russia will be forced to cut down this component of the nuclear triad by 40%," Benov noted.

At the same time, he said, Moscow will be forced to rapidly increase the "sea" (from 30% to 50%) and "air" (from 10% to 30%) components of the triad; these efforts demand multi-billion spending and would not promote an increase in the country's defensive potential. For their part, the Americans have nothing to change.

Benov predicts that in such a form as it was signed this January 3, the START-2 Treaty cannot be ratified and will not be ratified by the Russian Supreme Soviet.

PRAVDA Rebutts USA Institute on START II

93WC0050A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 93 p 5

[Comments on START II culled from PRAVDA: "Permit Us To Disagree"]

[Text] An analytical report of the Russian Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute, "The New U.S. Administration and Russia," was disseminated recently. It did not, naturally, ignore the question of the START II Treaty. Or how necessary it is for Russia.

Following familiarization with the report, one is left in no doubt as to just whose recommendations formed the basis of the document vainly signed by the president. Yes, the titled personnel of the celebrated institution are doggedly propounding their viewpoint. They are being helped by our one-sided, semiofficial propaganda. So clumsily at times, what is more, that one wonders: Whose interests is the United States and Canada Institute actually pursuing?

The national media frequently have no room, on the other hand, for different views at odds with the opinion of this esteemed institution. But this does not mean that there is no other viewpoint. We quote merely certain alternative arguments published in PRAVDA.

Report: *The preparation and signing of this treaty in so short a time were possible as a result the fundamental positive change in the very nature of international relations.*

PRAVDA, Viktor Linnik: Is it possible in principle for a country in such a state of decline as Russia is currently to conclude an equal treaty with the world's leading power?... Is it true that Kozyrev's team is 10 times smarter than its predecessors in Smolenskaya? After all, as the Russian president said, the previous agreement took 15 years, and the new team handled the matter in just a few months. (6 January 1993)

Report: *....It (the treaty—ed.) has imbibed and adapted to the new political situation the entire experience accumulated by the parties in the course of the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms.*

PRAVDA: In our view, fundamental measures in the sphere of a reduction in the strategic offensive arms of Russia and the United States should be accompanied in parallel by a special Russian-American declaration on no first use of nuclear weapons against one another.

Negotiations on a complete and general ban on nuclear weapons commenced on the initiative of the USSR in the 1970's. The conclusion of this treaty would prevent the creation of any new strategic and tactical nuclear weapons systems to replace the existing ones. Washington is as yet unwilling to assume such commitments. (6 August 1992)

Report: *The conditions of a shortening of the timeframe of realization of the treaty are (stipulated—ed.) in such agreements for the first time....*

PRAVDA, Sergey Kurginyan, candidate of physical and mathematical sciences, chairman of the board of the Experimental Creative Center Corporation: We are obviously losing out to the United States under the conditions of the rapid change in the structure of our strategic complex.... Reductions in the time frame have already been inserted in the treaty, the model thereof. This is a dynamic approach which is a losing proposition for us.... After all, our economic system is far less maneuverable. (3 March 1993)

Report: *Both sides preserve more than sufficient potential for inflicting on an aggressor unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike.*

PRAVDA, Lieutenant General Viktor Starodubtsev: The United States is confident of preserving its "deterrence potential." And Russia? An affirmative answer to this question is hampered by the unresolved nature of two major problems.

First, problems of antimissile defenses (ABM) ...

Second, the totally unjustified disregard for the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles. (11 February 1993)

Colonel General Vladislav Achalov: The Americans are, as we know, ahead in the sphere of the creation of the SDI and a ground-based ABM system, which are not affected by the treaty, either. Will not the United States in 10 years' time, after the destruction of our missiles which penetrate this system, be for us practically invulnerable, simultaneously preserving total impunity for itself? (11 February 1993)

Report: *....There is increased strategic stability thanks to both sides' reduced capacity for a surprise disarming strike....*

....As a result of the mutual reductions, the strategy of a preemptive first strike loses its technical backing.

PRAVDA, Vladimir Potapov: Lest we succumb to the blandishments of the crushing argument of the disarmament sirens, we would recall that a "counterforce" or "preemptive" nuclear strike is the essence of American military doctrine.... At the UN General Assembly second special disarmament session (1982), the USSR undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The United States and its allies made no such declarations, nor do they intend to do so.... (5 January 1993)

Lieutenant General Viktor Starodubtsev: It is clear that if the United States has sought acceptance of its ICBM proposals, it has been in order, given equality in this type, to have superiority in all other types of strategic offensive arms thanks to better technology, better basing conditions.... A whole class of strategic arms, whose unchecked deployment could turn the logic of balanced reductions into chaos, has deliberately been left outside the framework of the limitations. (11 February 1993)

Report:Two basic components of our strategic forces—ground- and sea-based—acquire the attribute of approximate full strength. This situation affords the Russian side essential advantages and creates serious safeguards against scientific and technological breakthroughs of the other side....

PRAVDA, Vice Adm Rudolf Golosov, hero of the Soviet Union: The United States plans to continue up to 1997 the construction of the latest Ohio-class submarines.... The construction of submarines for the Russian Navy, on the other hand, ended in 1990.... As far, however, as aviation systems are concerned, following the disintegration of the USSR, the bulk of strategic aviation has remained in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.... (23 February 1993)

Colonel General Vladislav Achalov: Is the fact that Russia is artificially adapting the structure of its defense potential to American standards—aviation and submarines—commencing an arms race in areas in which we are hopelessly behind, justified? And can they be caught up at all under the conditions of the breakdown of the economy and the defense sectors? (3 March 1993)

Sergey Kurginyan: We are adapting our strategic complex in optimum fashion to their defense system. (3 March 1993)

Report: The treaty....gives priority to the deployment of a grouping of single-warhead missiles, whose research and production base is in Russia, over the deployment of a new generation of MIRV'd (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles—ed.) missiles, whose main base is in Ukraine....

PRAVDA, Petr Belov, candidate of technical sciences:The main flaw of START II, as the basis of the "new world order," is that it does, indeed, secure a future without fear, but not for all, only for the United States. Inasmuch as it deprives Russia, and Ukraine also, of the SS-18 and SS-24 heavy missiles "disciplining" our partner. At the same time, on the other hand, it enables the United States to create a comparatively cheap "nuclear umbrella" of antimissile defenses.... (14 January 1993)

Major General Boris Surikov:By the "cost-efficiency" criterion, Moscow has agreed to the worst, most wasteful option (of the agreement—ed.). (11 February 1993)

Nikolay Musiyenko:Until Ukraine ratifies the START I Treaty, it is pointless for Russia even to ponder the START II Treaty being pushed by the president. Kiev is by its stubbornness essentially saving Russia as yet from wholesale disarmament.... The United States' NATO allies are in no hurry to become nuclear-free, incidentally.

Whitehall intends to refit Britain's submarine fleet with the American Trident nuclear missile systems, ITAR-TASS reports. (16 March 1993)

Report:an important aspect of the treaty is the fact that it creates a precise international-legal context for the elimination by the year 2003 of all the nuclear weapons on the territory of Kazakhstan and Ukraine....

PRAVDA, Viktor Linnik: How practicable, generally, is the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty without the participation therein of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan? It is true that the president of Ukraine has confirmed his country's intention to become nuclear-free. Only he has not said **when**. Yet by the year 2003 Ukraine's nuclear potential will be entirely comparable with that of Russia. Do the increasingly manifest anti-Ukraine tunes of the Foreign Ministry in connection with the START II Treaty correspond to Russia's national interests? (6 January 1993)

Anatoliy Gorbachev, captain 1st rank of the reserve: The preservation by these states (Ukraine and Kazakhstan—ed.) of their nuclear potentials is by no means a proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is the preservation of the status quo of military-political balance in the world. (4 March 1993)

Russian, Ukrainian Polemics Over Nuclear Weapons

Russian Spokesman on 'Nuclear Drift'

LD1304163393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1424 GMT 13 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Oleg Polovko and Vladimir Suprun]

[Text] Moscow, 13 Apr—Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, director of the Press and Information Department of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, told a briefing today that Ukraine's position on nuclear weapons deployed on its territory was "primitive and reminiscent of the 'Cold War'". He was commenting on a statement by the press service of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, published in reply to the Russian Government's expression of concern over the complications that have arisen in connection with nuclear weapons stationed on Ukrainian territory.

Noting that Ukraine's "nuclear drift" was causing growing concern in world public opinion, Yastrzhembskiy declared that the Ukrainian Government's document contained no answers to the specific proposals made by Russia on this issue, or any concrete initiatives of their own. On the contrary, he stressed, Ukraine continues to demand "endless guarantees and sweeteners" from the international community as conditions for honoring the commitments that the Ukrainian leaders have already given—namely, to ratify the START I Treaty and to join the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as a non-nuclear state.

Referring to Russia's actions, the diplomat stressed that it had not only declared its readiness to do its utmost to ensure that the nuclear materials obtained as a result of

the scrapping of nuclear warheads can be used as fuel for Ukrainian nuclear power stations, but had also handed Kiev the necessary computations and a draft agreement on this. However, there has not been any reply from the Ukrainian side. According to Yastrzhembskiy, Ukraine was also offered a detailed program, the implementation of which would have eased concern over nuclear weapons.

Russia, *inter alia*, proposed in its program: by 1 August 1993, to stop training sorties on all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles temporarily stationed on Ukrainian territory; by 1 August 1994, to withdraw to Russian Federation central factory bases the heads of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and also their warheads, with the aim of subsequent disassembly; and, by 1 August 1993, to transfer to a reduced level of combat readiness and withdraw to Russian Federation central factory bases the nuclear warheads of long-range cruise missiles for heavy bombers temporarily stationed on Ukrainian territory, with the aim of subsequent disassembly.

According to the diplomat, Russia is also ready to give Ukraine help on the question of destroying delivery vehicles used both for heavy bombers (the appropriate proposal has already been sent to the Ukrainian side) and missiles. It is precisely this problem that Ukraine has represented at various levels as overly difficult. The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman warned against the possibility that Kiev will divide two closely connected questions—the ratification of the START I treaty by Ukraine and its joining in the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as a non-nuclear state. Detaching one question from the other, he stressed, would mean violation of the Lisbon obligations and would create obstacles to the beginning of the process of genuine nuclear disarmament.

Further Report

OW1304160493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1528 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dmitriy Voskoboinikov and Igor Porshnev; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukraine's "nuclear drift" makes the world community increasingly concerned, the Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Press and Information Department, Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, said at Tuesday's [13 April] briefing in Moscow. In its statement issued in response to the Russian government's statement concerning nuclear arms deployed in Ukraine, Kiev said nothing to alleviate Moscow's concern. It made no "concrete" proposals either.

In the meantime, said Yastrzhembskiy, Ukrainian diplomacy is trying to "ease" the world community's anxiety by resorting to "rather standard methods". "It is doing so even though Russia pursues no such policy," he said.

According to Yastrzhembskiy, Kiev persists in piling up demands aimed at obtaining "endless" guarantees and "indulgences" from the world community. It demands that Ukraine be paid billions of dollars for ratifying the START-I Treaty and for joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a denuclearized state. "If this isn't a political game around nuclear weaponry, what is it?" he asked.

According to the diplomat, Russia did not simply declare its willingness to do its best to enable Ukraine to use the nuclear materials obtained as a result of utilizing nuclear warheads as fuel for its nuclear-power plants. All the calculations and the relevant draft agreement were forwarded to Kiev. "However we have been waiting for a reply in vain for over a month now," said Yastrzhembskiy.

Kiev has been given a detailed program, whose implementation "would put an end to the anxiety concerning nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine," he said. Moscow suggested to Kiev:

1. Cancel before August 1, 1993, the targetings for all delivery vehicles temporarily deployed in Ukraine.
2. Remove the warheads from the ICBM and take them to Russian territory for their further dismantling before August 1, 1994.
3. Put on lower combat readiness the nuclear warheads of the long-range cruise missiles for heavy bombers temporarily deployed in Ukraine and remove them to Russia before August 1, 1993, for their further dismantling.

According to Yastrzhembskiy, Russia is prepared to give Ukraine the most effective aid in the efforts to scrap the delivery vehicles. "We are willing to resolve this problem also in regard to heavy bombers (the relevant proposal was already submitted to Ukraine), and in regard to missiles," he said.

Yastrzhembskiy also voiced concern over the possibility that Kiev will "blow" two issues: Ukraine's ratification of the START-I Treaty and its joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in the capacity of a denuclearized state. "Such an approach signifies that some people in Kiev intend to either go on with Ukraine's "nuclear drift", or continue to stir public opinion. In any case to separate one issue from the other would mean to violate the commitment made in Lisbon and put obstacles on the road to genuine nuclear disarmament," he stressed.

Russian Government Statement Viewed

PM1304090993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 9 Apr 93 p 2

[Igor Sukhanov report: "Is Ukraine Threatened With Another Chernobyl? That Danger Has Arisen Because the Country's Leaders Are Refusing To Carry Out Their Nuclear Weapons Pledges"]

[Text] The Russian Government has issued a statement on the nuclear weapons sited on Ukrainian territory. The document has appeared for many reasons.

As you know, L. Kravchuk's signature on the decision adopted by the CIS heads of state on nuclear weapons nonproliferation defines Ukraine's status as a state without nuclear weapons. However, a Ukrainian presidential edict of 5 April 1992 (No. 209) followed by Order No. 09 [as published] issued by the Ukrainian defense minister 23 April 92 included the 43d Missile and 46th Air Armies and their combat units—176 missile launch systems and 43 strategic bombers—in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In May 1992 the personnel of two nuclear-technical units in the 46th Air Army, where roughly 670 strategic nuclear warheads [boyezaryady] are sited, took the Ukrainian oath. The flight personnel of all the strategic bombers also took the Ukrainian oath. There is constant pressure on servicemen in the 43d Missile Army to take the Ukrainian oath. Ukraine has thus obtained the potential to use nuclear weapons.

In January 1993 a new subunit was formed within the Ukrainian Armed Forces structure—the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Center for Administrative Control of the Strategic Nuclear Forces.

All these and other elements undoubtedly indicate one thing: Ukraine clearly aspires to the status of a nuclear power.

That is why Kiev refused when Russia asked to take the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory under its jurisdiction. The same fate befell a compromise proposed by Moscow whereby nuclear warhead assemblies would be detached from ballistic missiles and long-range cruise missiles within a very short period—roughly 18 months—and moved to Russian territory for destruction under Ukrainian supervision, and targeting information would be removed over the following few months from all nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in order to completely preclude the use of nuclear weapons.

Instead it became obvious during the second round of Russian-Ukrainian talks at the beginning of March 1993 that Ukraine has no intention of completely eliminating the strategic arms on its territory within seven years as envisaged by the START I Treaty. Kiev is trying to force Russia to recognize that the nuclear weapons belong to Ukraine and, what is more, is striving to ensure that Russia takes responsibility for ensuring the safekeeping of those weapons.

At a press conference in connection with the Russian Federation Government Statement Russian Deputy Defense Minister B. Gromov stressed: "Nuclear weapons cannot have two owners and nuclear safety cannot be ensured by two entities. Russia is not failing to supply Ukraine with replacement subassemblies for the nuclear weapons in order to put pressure on Ukraine. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry promptly

replaces all sets of assemblies on nuclear munitions under Russian statehood alone."

Ukrainian Press Speculation

93UM04644 Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
10 Mar 93 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Mykola Horenko, correspondent: "START-I: A Right Rather Than an Obligation: Should Ukraine Be a Nuclear Power or Not?"]

[Text] This question can certainly be called the question of the year, the decade, or even the question of our century. Indeed, who nowadays is not interested in this problem and concerned about it? It is of interest to the rich because the nuclear status of any state affects its international authority and recognition. It concerns all of us because nuclear capability—particularly that of Ukraine—is a great responsibility for our state vis-a-vis the world community for safety and for preventing nuclear accidents or catastrophes....

Therefore, the meeting of Ukrainian people's deputies participating in the START-I program, attended by a broad-based group of Ukrainian and foreign journalists, underscored once again the global scale, scope, and far-ranging nature of the topic as to whether Ukraine should have nuclear or non-nuclear status....

In essence, this was a consultative conference of the people's deputies, rather than a press conference. Therefore, it was strictly businesslike in nature. A report was delivered containing the principal conclusions drawn from an analysis of the legal aspects of Ukraine's ratifying the START program and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This report focused on the feasibility of our joining in the appropriate international treaties and ensuring Ukraine's national interests, along with guaranteeing its security on an equal-rights basis as a participant in international relations.

The rapporteur—a scholar from the Institute of International Relations—remarked, first of all, that the international system by its very nature is such that each state each nation-state participating in this system is concerned for its own security and is itself responsible for the reliability of that security. The free and fully independent sovereign state of Ukraine is on firm legal grounds with regard to this problem. According to the international and national laws now in effect, Ukraine—as a newly created state—at the present time has no obligations with respect to international treaties. And it should reach a political decision on this matter, with complete freedom and without heeding any demands from other states.

This overall conclusion stems from an objective assessment of the legal situation in which Ukraine finds itself in connection with ratifying the START-I Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The scholarly expert pointed out that the characteristics of this situation could be broken down into the following three elements: **the nature of Ukraine's legal relations with other states; legal succession; and Ukraine's sovereign right to security, as well as the need to implement it.**

In looking at the nature of Ukraine's legal relations with other states relative to nuclear weapons, he indicated that—at the moment when Ukraine was created as a sovereign, independent state—there were considerable supplies of nuclear weapons on its territory. Does it flow from that fact—the expert asked—that Ukraine should eliminate these weapons? Do other states—including nuclear states—have the right to demand that Ukraine abandon nuclear weapons? The law now in effect provides a negative answer to this question. Ukraine has no such obligations. Nor do the other states which are participants in the international system have any such rights. As a sovereign state and a party to international law, Ukraine is directly subordinate to the valid norms of international law. The universal international law now in effect contains no normative act prohibiting states from having nuclear weapons, nor does it mandate their elimination. That is to say, as of the present, there is no juridical document which would obligate a state to rid itself of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, states are not prohibited from doing so, if that is what they desire.

Thus, questions relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, of reducing their arsenals, or of completely destroying them are regulated not by international law, but rather on the basis of international agreements among the nuclear powers. Examples of the foregoing are START and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Ukraine has no such treaties and, therefore, has no obligations in this field. We would have them from the moment that we sign such treaties.

Does the Declaration of Ukrainian State Sovereignty—wherein Ukraine's non-nuclear status was formulated—entail any legal consequences for our state? Do other states have the right to demand that Ukraine eliminate nuclear weapons in accordance with the above-mentioned declaration of a non-nuclear status? No. The Declaration—which has great overall political importance—is not a juridical fact in international relations. Section 9 of the Declaration is declarative in its nature and asserts an ultimate goal....

Hence, the attempts by some foreign states and certain officials to make demands on Ukraine and who tailor their international principles and legalistic justification to this are juridically invalid. Ukraine remains legally free to choose its own policy with regard to nuclear weapons.

In analyzing legal succession, the expert noted that nuclear weapons had been left in Ukraine by the army of the former Soviet Union without any violations of the

norms of international law. They are the exclusive property of Ukraine. All the participants in the international system have to recognize this fact and respect it as reliable.

Ukraine's legal succession to these nuclear weapons stems from the treaty between the nuclear powers dated 1 July 1958, as well as from treaties and agreements dating from 1978 and 1983. **"The Domain of Ukraine stands on firm legal grounds with regard to its possession of nuclear weapons."** Such was the conclusion reached by the expert, who buttressed it by detailed legal documentation.

"Ukraine can abandon its inherited rights to be a nuclear power. But the exercise of such a negation is a right of Ukraine, rather than its obligation." Such was the weighty conclusion arrived at by the expert working group of scholars. **Ukraine has the right to join in the START-1 Treaty, which included the former USSR. But joining it is a right of Ukraine, rather than its obligation."**

Thus, discussion nowadays can deal with Ukraine's nuclear disarmament on a parity-type basis with the other nuclear powers, rather than the absolute elimination of nuclear weapons by Ukraine as an obligation to the international community. But the latter is precisely the way that certain Western countries yearn to formulate Ukraine's nuclear policy. Well now, the conclusions drawn by the working group, the legal grounds for the policy of disarmament and reducing the arsenal of nuclear weapons comprise a weighty contribution to the strategy and tactics with regard to this question on the eve of putting START-1 up for ratification by the Ukrainian Supreme Council.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Notion of 'Plasma Weapon' Raised on Eve of Vancouver Summit

Joint Testing of Top Secret Weapon Proposed

PM0104165793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Apr 93 First Edition p 1

[Viktor Litovkin report: "On the Eve of Vancouver Russia Proposes to United States Joint Experiment With Plasma Weapon"]

[Text] As the editorial office has learned, during Russian President Boris Yeltsin's talks at the summit with U.S. President Bill Clinton in Vancouver our country may propose staging on the Pacific atoll of Kwajalein a large-scale joint experiment in repelling a missile attack.

Russian scientists who have worked for a long time in the top-secret sphere of the defense industry have given this experiment the name "Trust." Scientific and production centers also took part in preparing the project,

including such centers as the experimental physics scientific research institute in the closed city of Arzamas-16, the Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute, the Central Scientific Research Institute of Machine Building in Kaliningrad, outside Moscow, where our best missiles were created, the Scientific Research Institute of Radio Instrument Making, which is part of the structure of the supersecret interstate joint-stock company "Vypel," leading institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and other collectives.

What is the project about? Academician Rimiliy Avramenko, the scientific director of the work and chief designer at the Scientific Research Institute of Radio Instrument Making, told me that what is involved here is an experiment with a so-called "plasma weapon," which can hit any object moving in the earth's atmosphere—be it a missile, a warhead, an aircraft, or some other artificial or natural heavenly body such as a meteorite.

This is accomplished using an existing technological base without putting any components into space and using the kinetic energy of the object itself, which is intercepted electronically by a plasmoid [kotoromu stavit svoeobraznuyu elektronnyu podnozhku plazmoid] created by facilities on the ground—microwave or optical (laser) generators, and antennae and other systems.

Furthermore, the energy directed by the earth-based components of the gun—and this is clear from our diagram—is focused not on the target itself but on its flight path in the area of the atmosphere directly ahead of it. It ionizes that area of atmosphere and totally upsets the aerodynamics of the missile or aircraft. The object leaves its trajectory and is destroyed by enormous stresses. It is virtually impossible to counter this effect of terrestrial energy.

Academician Avramenko asserts that in this form of ABM and antiaircraft defense plasma weapon it is possible for the first time to combine in a single unit radar observation systems and systems for the electronic delivery of the plasmoid—the kill mechanism—to the target at the speed of light. This makes the plasmoid a virtually invulnerable weapon providing guaranteed protection against any attack from space or the upper or lower strata of the atmosphere.

The radar observation systems can lock onto a target or group of targets at a distance of 100 km, and the plasmoid destroys them at an altitude of up to 50 km according to the task in question. Furthermore, you do not need to build great power stations for this—the energy output of a few dozen domestic storage batteries for each of the powerful generators belonging to the complex is quite sufficient to make such protection feasible. Star wars and attack by nuclear terrorists and other aggressors will hold no fears for any state with such a supergun for its protection.

As we have already said, this gun was created in Russia. The research on it has gone beyond the laboratory walls

and is being tested in real life. But a full-scale experiment against real targets—ICBMs and supersonic planes—requires great financial outlay. Our country is proposing that the United States pool its efforts with us in this and jointly create a global antimissile protection system.

Rimiliy Avramenko believes that such an experiment could be conducted on the U.S. atoll of Kwajalein in the Pacific, where the appropriate material and technical base exists and where the U.S. military have already conducted a number of tests in the SDI program.

Russia would supply the necessary equipment there on board aircraft carriers [avianosnyy korabl] and other ships. It is well known that Russia has considerable achievements and advantages in the sphere of creating powerful microwave generators (potential components of the plasma gun) and in the sphere of the new science of plasma-gas dynamics. The United States would supply the solid-state electronics and computer technology. The missiles for the experiment could be launched either from the territory of our country or from U.S. test ranges.


Such an experiment, in the Russian scientist's opinion, using our equipment and proportional U.S. financial participation, will be relatively inexpensive at just \$300 million. That is half the amount planned by the U.S. budget for the creation of its own plasma weapon. In the experts' opinion, if the United States continues working on this problem independently it will cost it \$30 billion. But it is not the only country which could use the two countries' military-technical achievements for the general good.

I asked the academician whether or not the "Trust" project contravenes the 1972 Treaty signed by the two countries on the limitation of ABM systems

"No," he replied. "That treaty makes no mention of joint work on global protection against missile attack. Twenty years ago it could not have occurred to anyone that such a thing would be possible. In those days that was not only unscientific, it was hostile science fiction."

Well, fantastic projects can become reality too, not only in science and technology but in international political relations and even in the sphere of international security and the defense sectors. Admittedly, some Russian experts doubt that the Americans will accept our proposals on the joint antimissile experiment. People in the United States, they say, are not very fond of admitting Russian advances in military matters, much less reinforcing and spreading them.

But I think that this fear is also a throwback to the old days.




General Concept of the Experiment for the "Trust" Program

Key: 1. Warhead; 2. Moving plasmoid; 3. Russian aircraft carrier with a complex of energy equipment; 4. Russian coast-based energy equipment complex; 5. Russian ship with control and observation equipment; 6. Communications systems; 7. Kwajalein Atoll; 8. The module is the basic element of the equipment complexes; 9. Tracking radar

Further on Proposal for Joint Test

MK0304122093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 3 Apr 93 p 2

[Summary] Illustration from Aleksandr Stukalin article entitled: "Russia Offers New Weapons for SDI. New ABM System Can Strike Any Target With 100-Percent Accuracy."



Sketch of Proposed Test of a New ABM System at Kwajalein Atoll

Key: 1. Moving plasmoid; 2. Russian aircraft carrier with combat equipment complex; 3. Warning radar; 4. Russian coast-based combat equipment complex; 5. Russian ship with observation equipment; 6. Communications systems

Project Leader Comments

PM0604113993 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2000 GMT 2 Apr 93

[Report by Aleksandr Ostrovskiy and Yuriy Shipovskiy; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] According to reports from Washington, problems and prospects for Russian export of space satellites, communication facilities, and weapons, including new ones, such as for example the plasma weapon, are to be discussed among other topics at the talks between Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton.

[Ostrovskiy] This plasma weapon could become the most reliable umbrella against any aerospace attack. Star

Wars and nuclear terrorists would pose no threat to states possessing such a defensive superweapon, which could even be used to mend ozone holes.

Russian scientists have proposed that this joint experiment project be called Trust [preceding word in English].

[Academician R. Avramenko, scientific leader of the project] This weapon belongs to the category of weapons which act not on the attacking object itself but on the conditions governing its movement. The closest analogy would be a slippery road. It is something resembling slippery conditions, or literally a slippery environment which causes an aircraft or a rocket to be thrown off course.

This specific initiative is being put forward by us as a development of the Yeltsin-Bush initiative of last year. They were the first to propose then that the possibility be considered of elaborating specific projects, specific work toward the creation of a global defense system.

TASS Report on 'Plasma Weapons'

93P50155A Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Par 93 p 3

[ITAR-TASS 1 April report: "A 'Plasma Shield' Instead of SDI"]

[Text] It is not excluded that one of the questions on the agenda of the upcoming summit meeting of the U.S. and Russian presidents will be the carrying out of the joint experiment "Trust" to test plasma weapons. A group of Russian scientists has put forward such an initiative. Carrying out the project was called "expedient" in letters by members of the government.

So-called plasma weapons, research on which was carried out in parallel by Russia and the United States, creates an impenetrable barrier for missiles and airplanes. "The energy, directed by ground-based weapons complexes, is concentrated not on the target but on that part of the atmosphere along its trajectory; it ionizes that part of the atmosphere and completely destroys the aerodynamics of flight. The target is thrown from its trajectory and is destroyed by monstrous stresses," said Rimiliy Avramenko, one of the developers of plasma weapons and deputy director of the Interstate Institute of Experimental Physics. "Neither a missile, not its front end, nor an airplane can parry such action."

Russian scientists propose carrying out a "Trust" field experiment at the U.S. Kwajalein test site in the Pacific Ocean. The project envisages that the Russian side will build the necessary apparatus while the United States pays its share of the financing (300 million dollars). A Russian aircraft carrier will deliver the apparatus to the area of the Kwajalein test site. The tests themselves will include the destruction of missiles, launched both by the Russians and by the Americans, at an altitude of several tens of kilometers.

The present project offered by Russian scientists is an alternative to SDI. Laboratory and mock-up tests have shown that it can lead from the years-long period of technical superiority for offensive systems to a peaceful existence under defense "umbrellas," guaranteeing protection against missile or aircraft attack and making such attacks absolutely senseless for those desiring to violate the peace. However, an unambiguous answer regarding the workability and effectiveness of the proposed new type of weapons can be received only on the basis of field experiments. Neither our country nor the United States has made a decision on carrying out field experiments because of their high cost and the absence of complete confidence in their success.

Prohibitive Cost of System Cited

Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2000 GMT 12 Apr 93

[From the 'Novosti' newscast: Video report by Mikhail Zotov, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Excerpt] Recently the press carried reports whose gist was that Russia has all but built a unique antimissile defense system, described as a 'plasma weapon.' The reports stated that the energy emitted by a ground components of this antimissile system is beamed at a section of the missile's flight path immediately in front of the missile, rather than at the actual target, that is the missile armed with nuclear warheads. A plasmoid created by ground-based laser or laser generators acts like a banana skin. [passage omitted]

In principle, it is possible to build such a plasma antimissile defense system. But no superpower in the world can afford the necessary expenditure. Furthermore, vast energy resources are needed to create a plasmoid and keep it in the missile's flight path. For this reason it is impossible to install the necessary equipment on ships as depicted in the diagrams. Both Russian and American specialists are aware of this. Incidentally, experts believe that this does not mean that work on plasma weapons is not underway. However, the creation of a working system is a very long way off.

Commentator Argues Against Global Protection System

93WC0039A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 5, 23 Mar 93 p 11

[Vladimir Belous "Expert Opinion": "Defense or Supervision? Global Defenses: More 'Against' Than 'For'"]

[Text] "If a missile with a nuclear warhead is shot down in flight, a vast area would be contaminated. Even the dispersion of 1-2 grams of plutonium on a square kilometer would make the terrain unfit for habitation for thousands of years. And a warhead contains several kilos."

The recently signed Russian-American START II Treaty is the object of a bitter polemic among political scientists and military analysts. This is a perfectly natural phenomenon inasmuch as it deals with reductions of unprecedented proportions in the arsenals of strategic nuclear arms which are relics of the "cold" war. I would like in this connection to point out the close relationship between offensive and defense arms. The fact that the text of the treaty does not contain a direct linkage between its fulfillment and compliance with the restrictions imposed by the ABM Treaty is noticeable. This treaty is mentioned merely in the preamble to the new agreement together with a reference to the joint statement of the presidents of the United States and Russia delivered in June 1992 on the parties' consent "...to work

out together with their allies and other interested states a concept of global protection against a limited ballistic missile attack." Such a symbiosis contains the embryo of future intrinsic contradictions, which could ultimately lead to a devaluation of the ABM Treaty, which is, as many analysts acknowledge, a most serious obstacle in the way of the arms race and an effective means of a strengthening of strategic stability. But certain political scientists, in Russia included, have of late been trying to show that this treaty, concluded at the height of the "cold" war, is out of date and in need of revision. If it is assessed in the context of the overall arms reduction accords, proposals concerning a tightening of requirements should have been expected on their part. But it is a question of a liberalization of the restrictions imposed by the treaty. Specifically, the question of a broadening of the possibility of the testing of individual ABM components, the creation of several defense areas and so forth which is being raised. How can we fail to recall here the attempt made in 1987-1988 in the United States to impart to this agreement a so-called "broad interpretation," the main purpose of which was to "push" SDI through the barriers of the ABM Treaty. But the U.S. Congress confirmed the interpretation of the treaty's basic provisions in the form in which they had been agreed in the period when it was signed.

The plans for the creation of a global protection system (GPS) affect political, military, and economic aspects of international relations. Examining the political aspect of this initiative, we should point plainly to the "original" sin it contained. It amounts to the fact that an attempt is once again being made to solve political problems by way of the unwinding of a new spiral of the arms race and the use of the latest military technology. This has previously been the case repeatedly, when for half a century the world community could on the basis of bitter experience see for itself the futility of such a path leading to impasse. It should be considered also that the creation of interstate military programs is, as a rule, of a bloc nature. The most developed industrial states of the North would take part in a GPS. This would lead to more decisive demarcation along the North-South line and increased military confrontation, would exacerbate the mistrust between them, would prompt certain countries to form alternative military alliances, and would loosen strategic stability.

Examining various GPS projects, military specialists of the United States recognize that the necessary efficiency of the intercept of attacking missiles could be assured only in the event of an echelon of space-based interceptors being created in this system. To accomplish this task it is planned putting strike weapons in space—this final natural sphere which has remained until now free of weapons. Having crossed the "space threshold" with weapons, mankind would be making the arms race process irreversible and uncontrollable.

In arguing about the military aspects of a GPS it is expedient primarily to assess the actual dangers of the use of nuclear weapons. It is well known that nuclear

weapons may be delivered to target with the aid of long-range, cruise, or tactical missiles and aircraft, civil aircraft included. A charge contained in an automobile and merchant ship or even delivered by terrorists in a suitcase could also be used to inflict a nuclear strike. The proposed GPS, however, would be aimed only against accidental or unsanctioned launches of individual missiles.

The supporters of a GPS do not conceal the fact that the main danger emanates from third countries. This being the case, their use of long-range missiles is the method of delivering a nuclear strike least accessible to them. Therefore, even in the event of a GPS being realized, the nuclear danger would by no means be removed. So is it worth it?

It should be considered also that an internal driving force of arms development is the constant antagonism between offensive and defensive weapons. The history of war testifies convincingly that each step forward in an improvement in defensive weapons leads to retaliatory steps in respect to offensive weapons and vice versa. The advantage has alternated between both sides, but the victory of any type of weapons has never been conclusive. It will be the same also in the event of the creation of a GPS. The deployment of an ABM system would inevitably lead to a further refinement of missile weapons in a number of countries. And the retaliatory measures could be, as shown by the anti-SDI plans, highly diverse, what is more.

It is essential also to bear in mind that in the event of a nuclear reentry vehicle being hit in flight, there would be a fallout of plutonium, which could contaminate a vast area. It is known that the dispersion of 1-2 grams of plutonium on an area 1 km square would make this terrain unfit for human habitation for thousands of years, and its warhead contains several kilos. For this reason the practical expediency of such an intercept of nuclear warheads is highly dubious.

It is no secret that together with research in the field of a GPS work is continuing in the United States within the framework of the SDI program, this has by no means been abandoned. It is sufficient to recall that for the present fiscal year it is planned allocating SDI more than \$3 billion. The start of the creation of first-stage ABM defenses is planned for 1996, in the course of which 100 missile interceptors are to be deployed around the Grand Forks Air Base (North Dakota). Subsequently it is contemplated deploying up to 1,000 ground-based missile interceptors in five or six areas on the territory of the United States. Unity of opinion concerning the space-based echelon has not yet been reached. But in an interview with the DEFENSE NEWS newspaper H. Cooper, former director of the SDI Organization, declared that for putting Brilliant Pebbles interceptors in space it would be a good idea using the high-capacity Soviet SS-18 missiles, which are being stood down from the effective force levels. In the event of a change in the international situation, the United States would have an

opportunity to deploy comparatively quickly broad-based, deeply echeloned ABM defense of national territory on the basis of developed and tested technology. This would lead to the disruption of military-strategic stability and ensure for the United States decisive military superiority on a global scale.

According to preliminary estimates, the cost of the creation of a GPS would amount to several tens of billions of dollars. It hardly needs to be said that the crisis state of Russia's economy rules out the possibility of its participation in the funding of a GPS on a par with the United States, and, as we know, he who pays calls the tune. People overseas are well aware of this and are for this reason counting on obtaining Soviet military technology on terms highly favorable to themselves and enlisting in work on it scientists of Russia's military-industrial complex. A similar method of use of the know how and experience of foreign scientists was employed successfully in the United States at the time of implementation of the Manhattan Project, in the course of which the atom bomb was created. Will not history be repeated? The United States is planning to purchase about 50 of the latest Russian military techniques, having paid for each an average of \$1 million approximately. We would point out for comparison that Washington was recently prepared to purchase liquid hydrogen-kerosene rocket engine technology for several hundred million dollars. In the event of the joint development of a GPS, the United States could get this technology for a pittance, practically.

At the same time, on the other hand, the United States is by no means about to share its advanced military technology with Russia. The United States had until recently maintained the ban on the sale to Russia of particular types of computers even. In addition, in enlisting its allies in the SDI program the Americans imposed very strict restrictions on the transfer of its technological innovations to them. But let us imagine for a minute that there has been an equivalent exchange of technology between Russia and the United States. The United States, possessing considerable possibilities, would try to make the maximum use of them in its own interests. Russia, on the other hand, having obtained the scientific and technological innovations, would not be in a position to realize them and would place them on the shelf, where many of its own unrealized projects are gathering dust as it is.

A fundamental issue of the said problem is the question of whether there are alternative approaches to the assurance of international security. What must the world community do to create a genuine system of collective security? In answering the questions which have been raised we should call attention primarily to the need for assurance of transparency in respect to the weapons of mass destruction with which various countries are armed and also the possible attempts to obtain them secretly. It is essential to require all states to submit to the United Nations full information on their arsenals, chemical arms, and military-economic potential. In addition, the

deliberate concealment of such information should be regarded as a crime of an international nature, for which the offending country could in accordance with a decision of the UN Security Council suffer sanctions of a political, economic, and even military nature.

A special role should be assigned a system of supervision of the nonproliferation of nuclear and missile technology and the production, storage, and use of fissionable nuclear material exclusively for peaceful purposes. The creation of a reliable system of control is a highly complex task. But there can be no doubt that it is far cheaper and dependable to control the first cause (the production and use of fissionable material) than combating numerous manifestations of their military application.

We may by way of analogy cite the Convention on the Banning and Destruction of Chemical Weapons, which does not provide for the deployment of a system of protection against them but imposes a ban on their production, storage, and use under strict international control.

It is essential to revise the existing concepts of international cooperation in the nuclear sphere excluding the possibility of the movement of nuclear materials from the civilian to the military sphere and also their secret manufacture. It is essential here to expand considerably the possibilities of the IAEA in respect to the search for undeclared nuclear facilities. It is essential to broaden the rights and functions of the agency and supplement its activity with the intelligence possibilities of the special services of various countries under the aegis of the United Nations.

It is essential also to create a global monitoring and inspection system. The basis of such a global space-based information-intelligence system initially could be the pooling of national technical monitoring facilities of Russia and the United States. Other countries' space-based observation facilities could be "built into" it subsequently. This system would be a serious stabilizing factor, would strengthen trust, and would restrain a potential aggressor from hostile actions.

The proposed system of protection differs fundamentally from a GPS primarily in that it is not based on weapons, would not lead to the creation of military-political groupings, and would not stimulate a further refinement of arms.

Of course, this article has expressed merely general ideas, which would have to be filled with real content. But there is no doubt that it is essential at the present time to rid ourselves emphatically of attempts at a military solution of political problems and shift the center of gravity increasingly in a solution of security problems to the international political level.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Russian and German Defense Ministers Meet in Moscow

Cooperation Agreement Signed

LD1304171093 Berlin ADN in German 1521 GMT
13 Apr 93

[Excerpts] Moscow (ADN)—Defense Minister Volker Ruehe and his Russian counterpart, Pavel Grachev, signed an agreement on cooperation between the defense ministries of Germany and Russia in Moscow today. Under the agreement security and military information as well as experts are to be exchanged. It is also planned to train members of the Russian forces in the Germany and members of the Bundeswehr in Russia.

Ruehe said the agreement is an investment in the future. Speaking to the press, he announced that a Russian officer will start a course at the Bundeswehr staff training college in Hamburg before yearend. In addition to this, 24 Russian generals and admirals will travel to Germany on a fact-finding tour on security policy issues.

Grachev and Ruehe affirmed that Russian troops will be withdrawn from Germany in strict accordance with the agreed schedule. [passage omitted]

In talks earlier today, the two ministers came out in favor of a political solution to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of the Vance-Owen peace plan. Speaking at a press conference, Ruehe said he briefed Grachev on German participation in the AWACS flights and the use of German aircraft to provide humanitarian aid for the people in the crisis area. According to the Russian defense minister, Moscow would be prepared, if asked, to participate in the humanitarian relief flights. Speaking to the press, Grachev expressed his concern about the fact that NATO fighter aircraft are being used to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. By doing this the alliance is running the risk of being drawn into an internal political conflict. [passage omitted]

Grachev Says Confrontation Doctrine Abandoned

OW1304163993 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1624 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian Armed Forces will never attack another state. In the near future the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation will debate the country's military doctrine which gives up any confrontation of military blocs and provides for cooperation with any state that has embraced peace and rejected violence. This is the essence of what Pavel Grachev, Defense Minister, told his German counterpart Volker Ruehe who is in Moscow on an official visit.

Grachev noted that the confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries had influenced the

formation of military districts and the allocation of weapons to them. As a result, when the Soviet Union disintegrated, the best units of the Soviet Army found themselves in the closest neighboring nations which used to be the Baltic, Carpathian, and Kiev military districts.

The two defense ministers have signed an interdepartmental cooperation accord. They are scheduled to visit the Tula Air Force Division April 14.

Russian Military Commander on Related Troop Withdrawal From Germany

OW1604021793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel and Orbita Networks in Russian 1845 GMT
13 Apr 93

[From the "Utro" program]

[Text] Talks between the Russian and German Defense Ministers began yesterday in Moscow. Obviously, one of the major questions is the withdrawal of Russian units, which should be concluded by 31 August 1994. Now that all kinds of rumors are being spread about order and discipline among the units being withdrawn, it would probably be wise to get an opinion on this from the commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces himself, Matvey Prokopyevich Bulgakov [last name as heard and identified by screen caption; previously identified as Burlakov]

[Begin recording] [video shows A. Barkhatov interviewing Burlakov]

Barkhatov: Matvey Prokopyevich, you may recall that there was a wave of quite scandalous stories about corruption supposedly being rife in the Group of Forces in Germany, about the people's money being misused, and about currency being deposited abroad. What is happening now? There was supposed to have been an investigation.

Burlakov: The general procuratorate has been working for more than a year. Unfortunately, nothing—I should say fortunately, nothing—has surfaced yet. We knew about every violation and took special measures against all culprits, and we will continue to do so.

Barkhatov: What kind of punishment was meted out and how many people were involved?

Burlakov: In the past year and a half—last year and this year—we sent 19 officers to jail for various wrongdoings. More than 100 people were relieved of their duties and sent back to Russia. A large number were held liable for material losses. Last year, losses totaled R1.9 million [rubles]. We withheld R2.5 million from those found liable for this disgrace. These people paid material restitution, and we shipped them out of Germany by administrative order.

Barkhatov: Thank you. Was all of this connected with the sale of weapons?

Burlakov: No. We have not had a single case in which weapons were sold. This was related to losses in the clothing, petroleum and lubricants, and food supply services. Not a single type of weapon was lost last year; since 1946, our group has investigated the loss of only 69 units of weapons—I repeat, since 1946.

Barkhatov: Small arms I hope, not armored vehicles?

Burlakov: Yes, small arms, including mostly pistols, carbines, and in recent years, machine guns. However, not a single weapon has been lost or sold in the past 2 years.

Barkhatov: Thank you.

Burlakov: All the best. [end recording]

Supreme Soviet Chairman Interviewed on Troop Withdrawal From Germany

PM1504165593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Apr 93 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov by unnamed KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place, date not given: "Russia Is a Great Power, and It Must Have a Strong Army"]

[Excerpt] **KRASNAYA ZVEZDA:** Ruslan Imranovich, recently forces have emerged which talk persistently about some kind of special role which the Army should supposedly play at a certain moment. Do you know what I am talking about?..

Khasbulatov: Yes. And you know, I greatly dislike this talk. I greatly dislike pressure on the military and attempts to subordinate them to certain influential forces. At the Congress and in the Supreme Soviet I have repeatedly stressed that there is the constitution and under the constitution the Army performs its duty precisely to the constitution. That is all. There can be no question of any kind of devotion of the Army to particular individuals in a democratic state. If we are serious politicians, we must primarily do everything to ensure that the Army is not entrusted with functions that do not properly belong to it.

At the same time I would not want to belittle the Army's role in society. We are a strong, huge country, and we must have a strong Army. You can see for yourself that, despite the grave situation in the economy, the Supreme Soviet pays very great attention to the Army's problems. For instance, just recently within a short time we have adopted six previously unparalleled laws regulating practically all aspects of army life.

That is not to say that everything is hunky-dory. To be frank, I was very unhappy with the decision to shorten the deadlines for the withdrawal of our troops from Germany because I am well aware that there is at present essentially nowhere to withdraw them to. We are leaving around 400 camps in Germany, and in exchange the

Germans promised to build us around 30. I don't know how many have been built, but I know for a fact that it is under half.

And once again troops are being withdrawn to densely populated areas where the Army is already living either out in the open, or in overcrowded barracks. Can such decisions be described as sensible?

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: What makes us act this way? Neither the affluent French nor the prosperous Americans have any intention of hastily leaving Germany.

Khasbulatov: I cannot understand it either. Especially as clear agreements were reached about this. Back at the start of last year I tried to persuade Chancellor Kohl: No pressure should be exerted, the situation is very complex, and neither they nor we will be able to solve all the problems at once. At the time I thought that mutual understanding had been reached...

Or take another point. I have already mentioned that we are handing over around 400 camps, airfields, dumps, and so forth to the Germans. Those are huge material assets. Our specialists calculated that we should get something like 10 billion marks for the lot. During the talks the Germans agreed to 6 billion. But eventually there emerged some strange agreements whereby we are owed nothing. Moreover, we are withdrawing the troops four months earlier than the agreed deadline. It is annoying. [passage omitted]

Russian Troop Movements in Poland

Transit From Germany To Increase

LD1304180493 Warsaw PAP in English 1730 GMT
13 Apr 93

[Text] Warsaw, April 13—The air and rail transit of the Russian armed forces from Germany via Poland will increase in 1993 in effect of shortened withdrawal deadlines. Six divisions, 8 brigades and the general staff of the former Soviet armed forces stationed in Germany will pull out across Poland to Russia this year, the Bureau of the Government Plenipotentiary for the Stationing of the Russian Federation's Military Units in Poland announced on Tuesday.

Some 4,000 Russian soldiers and 5,000 members of their families and civilian personnel are still deployed in 19 garrisons in Poland.

Base in Czarna Tarnowska Transferred

LD1604220993 Warsaw PAP in English 1929 GMT
16 Apr 93

[Text] Warsaw, April 16—A Russian military base in Czarna Tarnowska, the province of Tarnow, was turned over to the Tarnow provincial governor on the basis of a protocol signed in Tarnow on Friday by representatives

of the Russian and Polish Government plenipotentiaries for the stationing and withdrawal of Russian Armed Forces from Poland.

According to Polish Government plenipotentiary General Zdzislaw Ostrowski some 6,000 Russian facilities have been returned to Poland in the past 3 years. The remaining 1,000 facilities situated in 16 localities are to be turned over to Polish authorities by November 1992.

Belarus: U.S. Experts To Supervise Dismantling of MIG Aircraft

*WS1904091393 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian
1 Apr 93 p 1*

[Article by correspondent Alyksandr Makarau: "Experts Have Arrived in Belarus."]

[Text] On 31 March, a group of U.S. military experts came to our Republic to control the implementation of the CFE treaty.

The foreign inspectors will visit the "Lesnaya" military facility close to Baranovichi, where the first ten "MiG-27" aircraft will be dismantled. According to the CFE agreement, Belarus must dismantle about 100 military aircraft.

It is a known fact that 66 infantry fighting vehicles, 67 tanks, and 52 armored personnel carriers have already been dismantled.

In addition, 14 infantry fighting vehicles and one tank are prepared to be civilianized.

Further Discussion of Russian Troop Withdrawal From Lithuania

Russian Legislator Explains Grachev Statement

*MK1304102693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Apr 93 p 3*

[Tamara Nikolayeva report published in "Lithuania" column: "Chairman of Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Defense Committee Visits Lithuania. Sergey Stepashin Explained What He Meant Saying: 'As You Depart, You Must Stick Around.'"]

[Text] Sergey Stepashin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security Matters, has been on a 3-day official visit to Lithuania at the invitation of the Seimas' National Security Committee. The Russian parliamentarian's trip has been substantive and was apparently aimed not only at establishing links between the parliamentarians of Lithuania and Russia, as was announced officially, but also at clarifying the situation that has developed following the well-known statement by Russian Federation Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in Brussels on suspending the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic republics. During the 3 days, Sergey Stepashin met with the members of the Seimas Committee on National Security and

the Lithuanian state delegation at the talks with Russia, as well as with the territorial protection and internal affairs ministers. He was received by and had a conversation with Seimas Chairman Cheslovas Yurshenas and opposition leader Vytautas Landsbergis.

Lithuanian newspapers front-paged stories about the Russian visitor's presence in Vilnius, offering detailed accounts of Sergey Stepashin's press conference on the last day of his visit in which Nikolay Obertyshev, Russian Federation ambassador to Lithuania, also took part. The opposition newspaper LIETUVOS AIDAS published a quotation from Stepashin's speech at the Congress of Russian People's Deputies on 12 May 1992. At that time he spoke about the sharply negative reaction of the Russian parliamentarians to a request from Lithuania's Territorial Protection Minister Audrys Butkavichus to help Lithuania train experienced military cadres and also to help it with weapons. "And what are we seeing today?" the Lithuanian paper quotes Stepashin as saying. "All the Baltic republics have taken up a pro-U.S. orientation. But there is this great principle: As you depart, you must stick around. It is also applicable to the military sphere."

Incidentally, the meaning of this famous aphorism with respect to Russian policy in the Baltic states has aroused considerable interest among Lithuanian journalists, who asked Sergey Stepashin to comment on his speech at the above-mentioned congress of people's deputies. "'As you depart, you must stick around' should not be understood as a principle of imperial colonizing policy," Stepashin said. "It means only one thing in this case: It is necessary to remain partners and friends and to build relations between states on mutual respect for the equality and independence of each other. Both Russia and Lithuania have their own geopolitical interests and this means they have to live in peace together." Referring to the fact that he has authority from Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation defense minister; Vitaliy Churkin, the Foreign Ministry official overseeing the Baltic region; and Sergey Filatov, head of Boris Yeltsin's apparatus, Stepashin said that Russian troops will be pulled out of Lithuania exactly within the established time frame and that today this is no longer a problem. He stressed that the reaction from the Baltic states to Pavel Grachev's speech in Brussels has not been commensurate—after all, the time-frame for the troop withdrawal remains the same. Sergey Stepashin gave an assurance that there is no need to be afraid of interference by Russian troops in the affairs of the Baltic states under any circumstances. He also explained that the law on concessions for military servicemen doing their service in zones of military conflicts, adopted by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on 21 January, as far as the Baltic countries are concerned, applies only to financial concessions, and promised to take measures to correct some provisions of this law so as to preclude any ambiguity.

Stepashin expressed a very firm position responding to a question about Kaliningradskaya Oblast. He said that the future of Kaliningrad is that of an open economic

zone, and Russia will not put up with any territorial claims here. According to the Russian visitor, he has managed to find some common ground in Lithuania over the question of Kaliningradskaya Oblast. Stepashin stressed once again that Russia does not link the questions of troop withdrawal with human rights violations in the Baltic states. As for Lithuania, the attitude to human rights there, he noted, is constructive and civilized, while, in general, questions of human rights protection should be resolved by purely diplomatic means.

Defense Ministers Discuss Troop Withdrawal

*LD1604134393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1335 GMT 16 Apr 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow April 16 TASS—A meeting of Russian Defence Minister Army General Pavel Grachev and Lithuanian National Guard Minister Audrius Butkevicius was held today to discuss the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuanian territory, sources at the Russian Defence Ministry's press center told ITAR-TASS.

Latvia: Early Russian Troop Withdrawal From Liepaja Possible

*LD1104112193 Riga Radio Riga Network in Russian
2000 GMT 10 Apr 93*

[tEXT] Gaidis Zeibots, commander of the naval forces of the Republic of Latvia, has visited Liepaja. The aim of his visit was to acquaint himself with the situation in the town following the statement by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev about suspending the army withdrawal from the Baltic countries.

Zeibots met the command of the Russian Army garrison stationed in Liepaja. At the moment Liepaja is where the biggest contingent of the Russian Army is stationed, and is due to be withdrawn by the end of 1994. The military themselves, though, voiced an opinion that this process could be completed earlier, because individual military units, the withdrawal of which was envisaged for next December, had already left Latvia.

They reported that after Grachev's statement there had not been any orders from the Supreme Command concerning alterations to the troop withdrawal schedule.

Russian Withdrawal of Military Units From Baltics Being Observed

*OW1604183693 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1742 GMT 16 Apr 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The schedule for withdrawal of Russia's military units and ships from the Baltic states is being observed, according to the commander of St. Petersburg military marine base rear admiral Vladimir Grishanov at a meeting with Defence minister of Germany Volker

Ruhe. Newly arrived ships replace old ones and marines meet a lack of complement. According to V. Grishanov military might of St. Petersburg military marine base increases although on the whole the Baltic alignment of Russian military forces is diminishing.

He informed that military ships coming from Riga, Liepaja and Tallinn are placed in their conventional places of lodging—Kronshtadt, Primorsk and Lomonosov. New cantonments are also being built.

Discussion of Russian Troops in Other States

Yeltsin on Withdrawal From Baltics

*OW1504153493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1514 GMT 15 Apr 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] [Yeltsin] forecast that the basic feature of the great power after disarmament would be moral and historical values. In this respect, in his words, Russia's history was a thousand years old, whereas the U.S.A.'s only a little over 200 years old. "I am a nationalist, I want Russia to be a great power and Russia's integration with the world community," the President declared.

Yeltsin confirmed that Russian troops would remain in Estonia and Latvia as long the rights of ethnic Russians were being violated there. In his words, Russia would keep its military presence in Abkhazia until Georgia withdrew its troops. "They will retaliate to each shell fired in their direction with another two shells", he said. [passage omitted]

No Consensus on Withdrawal from Estonia

*PM1304112493 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 9 Apr 93 p 3*

[Report by Vasilii Fatigarov and Valeriy Gromak: "Talks Have Lasted One Year Already. Estonia Still Insists on Territorial Claims Against Russia"]

[Text] Russian-Estonian talks have been going on for a year now, but still no agreement has been reached on the vexed questions, in particular, of the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops. The latest round of talks—the 10th—held near Moscow, has confirmed this.

Agreement was reached only on economic problems—the mutual protection of investments and trade and economic regulations. But the most important questions, concerning the presence of Russian troops in Estonia, social protection of military pensioners, and citizenship for the Russian-speaking population, remain unresolved. Russian Federation Special Envoy Vasilii Svirin, leader of the Russian delegation, noted at a press conference that the opinions of the sides here are directly opposite. The envoy assessed the position as regards the settlement of questions of citizenship in Estonia as critical.

Estonian Minister of State Juri Luik [title as published], leader of the Estonian delegation, continued to insist at this press conference on the return of his republic to the borders of 1920; that is to say, territorial claims were in effect made against Russia. He also expressed concern over nuclear facilities on Estonian territory, meaning the Russian Navy Training Center in Paldiski. Here the position is understandable. The thing is that Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar stated in the Estonian parliament on the eve of the talks that "a great deal of interest is being displayed abroad" in the naval base in Paldiski. Although on the whole Laar expressed satisfaction with the Russian side's agreement to resolve the problem of the reactors at an international level with the invitation of specialists from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Estonian side is still rushing just as thoughtlessly to dismantle the nuclear facility, which is surprising.

As for the withdrawal of our troops, the Russian side's stance at the talks is unequivocal—the withdrawal is continuing (7,600 Russian military men and an insignificant quantity of equipment remain in Estonia), and will be carried out within a realistic timetable. But the Russian Federation is justly seeking social guarantees for military pensioners and observation of human rights in Estonia. On reviewing borders Vasilij Svirin stated the following:

"We will regard any attempts or intentions to revive the question of the 1920 border as an attempt to undermine stability in Europe."

The next round of talks will take place in Estonia 6-7 May.

Talks on Withdrawal From Moldova Extended

LD1304123493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0900 GMT 13 Apr 93

[Text] The talks on the status of the 14th Army and the terms of its withdrawal from the territory of the Dniester region of Moldova are to be extended. Journalists were told this by Anatoliy Kruchin, an adviser on military issues of the unrecognized Dniester Moldavian Republic [DMR]. He recalled that the talks between Russia, DMR, and Moldova started last November and were resumed in April. Three articles from the agreement were discussed but not one of them was adopted. The Russian delegation's position, Kruchin noted, involves an attempt to find a way towards political, economic, and military cooperation with both Moldova and the DMR, on whose territory the 14th Army is stationed. This was reported by Olvia-Press.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Scientist Discusses CW Destruction

93WC0045A St. Petersburg CHAS PIK in Russian
No 10, 17 Mar 93 pp 1, 10

[Article including interview with Dr. of Chemical Sciences Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov by Viktor Tereshkin

under "CHAS PIK Investigation: Secrets of Chemical Warfare" rubric: "Are We Fanning a Chemical Conflagration Everywhere to the Distress of All the Bourgeois?"; date and place not given]

[Text] The military-chemical complex produced hundreds of thousands of metric tons of toxic chemical agents during the years of its existence. Thousands of subjects of the military-chemical complex perished or were crippled at the secret plants. On orders from Moscow, toxic agents were burned, were sunk in the seas, and were buried in the ground. Precisely our military-chemical complex exported this deadly weapon to Iraq, Syria, Ethiopia, Angola, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Cuba. We are continuing to deceive the world community. The president of the USSR knew about this. Does the president of Russia suspect this? What lies on the bottom of the Gulf of Finland?

On 22 October of last year, my interlocutor, Dr. of Chemical Sciences Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov, was taken along with Vil Mirzayanov, also a doctor of chemical sciences, to Lefortovo Prison. The Ministry of Security of Russia saw the article that they wrote as a dreadful state secret. With this arrest, the Ministry of Security of Russia confirmed that Fedorov and Mirzayanov were telling the truth in the article "Poisoned Politics." The military-chemical complex produced and tested a new binary weapon whose effects are incurable.

Tereshkin: Lev Aleksandrovich, let us return to the origins of the military-chemical complex. Although I would not want to denigrate such a good word as "origin" by associating it with the military-chemical complex.

Fedorov: The Bible says: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." To understand what our military-chemical complex is, one must remember that Marshal Tukhachevskiy, so well loved by many, used chemical weapons in putting down the revolt at Kronstadt and then used them to poison the peasants at Tambov who rose up against Soviet authority with weapons in their hands. And here is something else to remember. April of 1989, Tbilisi. And once again there was a marshal but this time it was Yazov. Here are three points of reference. And compared with this, what does it mean to dump a hundred thousand metric tons of munitions into some sea or to bury them in the ground? It is a trifle, especially since one can always find some "specialists" who are very well prepared to explain that the sea and the land will benefit from this.

Tereshkin: Still, how much toxic material did our valiant chemical complex produce overall?

Fedorov: In preparing for war with an enemy on foreign territory, the military-chemical complex "fixed" its native land so that it is a matter of full-scale ecological warfare in our own territory, against the land and the water and hence against us—the people living there.

Now for some figures: by 1933, when our chemical generals took over all the experience from the Germans, a central military-chemical test range had already been set up in Shikhany. Here is a most characteristic detail—for the purpose of masking the organization that worked together with the Germans to develop military toxic agents, they called it: joint stock company for pest control and for the application of synthetic fertilizers. As early as 1943, Soviet factories for chemical death were providing about 200,000 tonnes of toxic agents a year.

What was the attitude toward people at these factories? For the chemical generals, they were just human material to be processed under the slogan: "Everything for the front! Everything for victory!" The plant in Chapayevsk produced yperite [mustard gas] and lewisite throughout the war. And rows of graves grew at the local cemetery. A train brought young boys and girls. In a month and a half or two months, they either died or became invalids. If they tried to refuse, they turned into dust at the camps. It is impossible to cure the damage done by mustard gas. The death rate was such that when they once failed to bring in manpower the plant had to shut down. This is the price of a chemical warfare. But the generals received 62 orders of Lenin.

According to information that is far from complete, mustard gas was produced at 24 plants, lewisite at 12, and adamsite at 9. And I am just naming those toxic agents that will be our eternal affliction, because they contain arsenic. In military terms, they are ineffective in today's battles. But ecologically they are terrible. According to my calculations, up to 500,000 tonnes of mustard gas alone were produced here.

Tereshkin: But military "ecologists" intend to destroy just 690 tonnes of mustard gas by the year 2000. Where is the rest of it?

Fedorov: They buried it, dumped it in the sea, and burned it. And now you have to search for it. And to imagine the geography of the search, here you have it for mustard gas, for example: there were five plants working in Moscow, you had the famous Voskresenskiy Combine and Shchepkovo in the oblast, there were the cities of Yefremov and Aleksin in Tula Oblast, and there was the large Okhtinskiy Combine in your St. Petersburg. Add to that the Omsk and Tomsk combines, Akhsha and Magnitogorsk in Chelyabinsk Oblast, the Bereznikovskiy nitrogen fertilizer plant, Usolye in Siberia—simply a giant, Nizhniy Tagip in Sverdlovsk Oblast, Stalingrad, Dzerzhinsk, Chapayevsk, Kineshma, and Kazan. And then Petrozavodsk. Plus Kirov in Murmansk Oblast. There they are, that is the scope of it. And I do not think that they were concerned about the lives and health of the workers anywhere. [end of interview]

Order: Burn, Sink, Bury

The first wave of the "salvaging" of the military toxic agents came after the end of the war.

The second wave arrived in the 1960's. This one, the one of the "thaw," was simply a panic. Chapayevsk received a telegram from Chukhnov, then chief of the chemical forces, stating that they were to destroy all stocks of toxic agents at once! Again next to the industrial site they opened up trenches, poured the mustard gas in there, hurriedly sprinkled something on top of it, and covered it up with earth. They proceeded differently with the lewisite bombs. They loaded them on 50 to 60 convoys and sent them directly to the Arctic Ocean. We still have to find out exactly which seas they dumped it in.

The admirals and generals speak of 12 regions where it was dumped. Four of them were in the Baltic Sea, four in northern seas, and four went to seas in the Far East. As of today the "greens" of St. Petersburg and journalists have been able to extract from the military people the coordinates of only 2 of these 12 regions—near Bornholm and Liyepaya.

The last wave—the big one—came at the end of the 1980's. The talks on chemical disarmament were coming to an end and it was clear that our stocks greatly exceeded those of the Americans. This was the source of the figure of 112,523 tonnes of munitions that the CPSU Central Committee planned to dump near Bornholm and Liyepaya using ships from the Kaliningrad and Liyepaya naval bases.

Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov is certain that in addition to the dumping at sea, the military-chemical complex was also still burying toxic agents at the time. Under the Soviet-American agreement, there must be just six to eight bases with a precise and set quantity and list of munitions. Our military people now swear that we have eight bases. Actually bases with chemical weapons were dispersed throughout Russia, not counting those formerly beyond the borders. What happened to the munitions that were there? It was this uncomfortable question—Where are the remaining weapons beyond the declared 40,000?—that Fedorov asked last summer in the newspaper SOVERSHENNO SEKRETNNO. The chief of the chemical forces Petrov immediately sent a panicky telegram to Shikhany—bury the adamsite at once. From Shikhany—our central test range where the elite of the chemical forces serve—they answered: yes, sir. And they buried it. No inspection from America will help us here. America is truly frightened by new generations of weapons and the government there has allocated millions of dollars to destroy them. Our ecological troubles from the submerged and buried old chemical weapons will be far away from the States.

How They Are Cultivating a Chemical "Sham" for the West

According to the information of Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov, they have been falsifying documents throughout the empire of the military-chemical complex since 1988. Why is this necessary? Because if the old production documentation is raised, it will be easy to reestablish the true volumes of weapons produced. For

example, the Volgograd plant began production of soman back at the beginning of the 1960's and continued it for 25 years. At the hearings in parliament, however, the military people declared: our stocks of soman amount to just 5,000 tonnes, which are now being presented for international inspections. This is incomparable.

The list of munitions is still another lie. In October 1987, they invited correspondents to Shikhan'y and the military, painstakingly demonstrating their openness under perestroika, showed the journalists 19 types of chemical munitions, including 6 with yperite (projectiles of rocket and cannon artillery, bombs) and one with CS gas (grenades). But none of this is in the chemical disarmament program now before the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. It has completely disappeared. The generals were especially assiduous about hiding grenades with CS, because the army used them in Tbilisi in 1989. The announced list does not include any bombs with V-gas, just bombs and rockets. But there is evidence—this was reported in the press of Cheboksary—that the depot that burned in Novocheboksary was precisely the depot with bombs loaded with V-gas. Fedorov carried out his own investigation and the workers who remember everything because they made the munitions with V-gas with their own hands told him that there were 2-tonne liquid canisters for helicopters and 45-kg parachute bombs as well as fragmentation bombs of 160-170 kg each and other bombs of 240-260 kg, from which a toxic agent was dispersed. None of this was in our documents that we presented at the international conference! They will yet expose us for this.

How They Are Confusing Us

The first meager information about the dumping in the Baltic came out in the winter of 1992. Then there was almost a flood that hit the front pages of the newspapers by the summer. At one time it seemed that the "green" party of St. Petersburg and the journalists would pressure the government and it would finally issue a directive on the beginning of an expedition to investigate two dumping regions under the "Ekobaros" program. This program was elaborated by the St. Petersburg association "Okeanotekhnika". But the summer passed and the government, after having approved "Ekobaros" in all ministries, failed to give its consent to the expedition. It is now clear that this powerful military-chemical complex applied all the brakes.

But the representatives of the military-chemical complex took very successful action, publishing a statement that all chemical weapons on the bottom of the Baltic have long since been neutralized and that there is no reason to spread panic here. Then another theme came into vogue: it was important to smear "Okeanotekhnika" and this was done.

The most distinguishing publication on this was the article "Yperite," an entire page in the October issue of ST. PETERSBURG VEDOMOSTI. The old performer

of delicate assignments Igor Borisovich Lisochkin interviewed the previously absolutely secret scientist Yevgeniy Andreyevich Sivolodskiy, a professor, doctor of sciences, chemist, Hero of Socialist Labor, and winner of the Lenin and state prizes.

The lion's share of the material was dedicated to mustard gas, which the future professor made at that same plant in Chapayevsk. Just as a missile with a multiple reentry vehicle is supposed to destroy several targets, this material performed multiple functions. The basic task was to state that the journalists writing about the threat from the submerged chemical weapons are lying and that only the chemical forces can be brought in to investigate the deposits. "No joint teams must be allowed within the range of a cannon. Otherwise we will end up with the usual trickery."

I can imagine the efforts that went into the preparation of this "brick" and how many screens were used to sift the information. But as hard as they tried, there is something the boys failed to see.

It follows from the text that not only toxic agents but also liquid chemical explosive substances—"panclastites"—were dumped in the Baltic. They not only can explode but also can cause burns and the rapid development of emphysema. Even before the war, our glorious Technological Institute had special departments, one of which worked on the synthesis of military toxic agents. Until this day Prof. Anatoliy Nikitovich Lavrentyev, an "outstanding" specialist in this area who is head of the department for biologically active substances (remember the pest control company?), has been working at the Technological Institute. The lecturer at the State Institute for Applied Chemistry D.D. Moldavskiy also told me that the professor is a star of the first magnitude on the "poisonous horizon." In December 1991, he gave to the conversion commission of the St. Petersburg Council descriptive information on the substances that could be dumped to the bottom of the Baltic. So thanks for the science, professor. Now the city dwellers know from where to expect trouble.

The Ministry of Security Is Stretching Its Muscles

"What happened to us was political persecution," Fedorov thinks. "By the way, it was the first since August 1991."

A few words about the motives causing two scientists to reach for the pen. Vil Mirzayanov was head of technical counterintelligence at his institute. Around that same Volgograd plant he was supposed to take measurements and make sure that the concentrations of chemical substances are so low that no Western spy would understand what this plant is involved with. Of course Mirzayanov knew what some concentration or other of a toxic agent can do to the organism of an adult or child. Mirzayanov discovered that the maximum permissible concentration was being exceeded by a factor in the hundreds. In that case, what is the use of thinking about

foreign spies? Here it is necessary to save our people who live nearby. He came to the institute management with this. The rest is clear.

Several years ago, Fedorov by himself began to fight against the danger of dioxine. And he soon understood that this superpoison had poisoned the land and water near the plants producing chemical weapons and that the barriers of secrecy had gone up around dioxine because the military-chemical complex is developing it as a chemical weapon.

Back on 10 October 1991, in an article published in KURANTY, Mirzayanov wrote that the experimental-industrial production of a new toxic substance has been organized in our country. When they interrogated Fedorov in October 1992, he asked the investigator how he could have been sleeping for an entire year. We had difficulties at the time, he answered evasively. Understandable difficulties: after August 1991, State Security was not concerned about Mirzayanov. Their own survival was at stake. And now that the KGB has escaped and changed its sign, it is showing who is boss in this country.

The article "Poisoned Politics" came out in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI on 20 September 1992. Mirzayanov and Fedorov were not taken to Lefortovo until 22 October. What difficulties did the people at the MBR [Ministry of Security of Russia] have this time? This is how Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov explains this:

On the day when MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI published our article, Vil and I sent the same material to the American newspaper BALTIMORE SUN. This city is the location of the oldest military chemical base in the United States and for this reason the inhabitants of Baltimore are very familiar with these problems. But the newspaper did not publish our article. Instead it carried out its own journalistic investigation and printed it within a month. This material on chemical weapons in Russia did indeed include secret information. With this comment: according to anonymous sources. The article came out on Sunday, 18 October. On the 19th, our civilian foreign "experts" recovered their senses and on the 20th orders were issued for our arrest. The MBR was won over, deciding that Vil and I were these anonymous sources.

What is now happening has already exceeded all bounds. They have continued to interrogate Mirzayanov even after 13 January 1993. But it was on the 13th in Paris when on behalf of Russia Foreign Minister Kozyrev signed the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. This is not the first time in the history of our internal affairs agencies that we have had this crass dullness. In the fall of 1941, when the Germans blockaded Leningrad and stood before Moscow, the slow millstones of the state security machinery were still "grinding up" those accused of having an anti-German disposition.

The MBR is now removing all experts on the side of Fedorov and Mirzayanov. To this day neither a lawyer nor the accused has looked at the list of secrets that cannot be divulged. What kind of trial will this be, where neither Mirzayanov nor his lawyer will know what is involved?

Vil Mirzayanov spent 12 days in Lefortovo Prison. He was in cell No 41. Bukovskiy once sat in cell No 42. When Vil came out, he joked bitterly:

"Lefortovo has been repaired. Everything is brand new and shining. So, democrats, everything is ready to receive you!"

Does Father Czar Know What the Boyars Are Doing?

On 21 November of last year, IZVESTIYA published documents of the CPSU Central Committee with the stamp "Top Secret." At one of its meetings in February 1989, the Politburo tried to ascertain "which specific chemicals and chemical equipment we were providing to Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ethiopia, Angola, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Cuba, whether these countries were being given any assistance in the establishment or operation of facilities capable of producing chemical weapons, under which programs were foreign officers-chemists being trained in the Soviet Union, and how it happened that we helped the Libyans to build an air defense facility that was intended for the production of chemical weapons." In their impotence and ignorance, the leaders of the country, including Gorbachev, signed off on it. The monster military-chemical complex was beyond the control of the Kremlin and had begun to spread across the globe.

A year ago, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin made a confession in a conversation with a theater director. It was published in IZVESTIYA. The essence of the disclosure: experts had been deceiving him, saying that bacteriological weapons were not being developed in Russia. Yeltsin was forced to carry out his own investigation and only then was he able to find out that the military people were lying. The Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons signed by our country is already 20 years old. As a matter of fact, work with anthrax was proceeding at full speed. It is now time for the president of Russia to carry out a new investigation: has the Moloch of the military-chemical complex been stopped or is it still developing and stockpiling new and more and more powerful kinds of weapons?

Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov is certain that the generals are trying harder to camouflage themselves, preparing for a chemical war under the conditions of their prohibition. This is the focus that they have become accustomed to over the 20 years of the prohibition of bacteriological warfare. And they are carrying out training in institutes and at bases and plants in the event of a visit by international inspectors. And that same directorate of the Defense Ministry General Staff that planned an offensive chemical war has been renamed Directorate for Ecology and Special Protective Systems.

One should also listen to the person who was one of the developers of a new generation of chemical weapons. Vladimir Uglev, senior scientific associate of the Volsk branch of the State Union Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology, asserts that as early as the beginning of the 1980's many specialists dealing with the problem of chemical weapons were expressing the opinion: the creation and stockpiling of more and more new kinds of chemical weapons by a nuclear power is not only redundant and senseless but also criminal, because ultimately the accumulated stocks will have to be destroyed.

What Secrets Are Kept by Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland

"Bornholm and Liyepaya are far from us," I once heard in the course of this journalistic investigation, "if all of these bombs begin to leak at the same time, it still will not reach St. Petersburg."

It was naive to think that such a preserve of the military-chemical complex as our cradle of three revolutions will not be soiled by chemical dirt.

On one of the days when a manuscript of another investigation—on the patch of radioactive contamination in Shkiperskiy Channel, where they "forged" weapons on the basis of military radioactive substances, an older person with an army demeanor showed up at the editor's office. He came to invite me to an ecological meeting but he managed to see the headline of the article and suddenly admitted:

"I also worked at Shkiperka but our main proving ground was on the island of Konevits on Ladoga."

That is how it came out that at Shkiperskiy Channel of Vasilyevskiy Island they dealt not only with radioactive but also with chemical weapons. And also with ways to protect against them. It is apparent that the people there were of great intellect, for they thought of putting the chemical proving grounds on the island of Konevits and the range for the testing of radioactive weapons among the rocks above Priozersk. They did not think about the fact that they themselves drink water from Ladoga and that their children and grandchildren will have to drink.

On the island of Konevitz, they worked with sarin, soman, and tabun. Somewhere in the area adamsite must remain in the soil. It lay there in piles, remembered a gray-haired retiree. Projectiles with toxic agents were exploded on the island and military people watched how they affected experimental animals. The solutions—for chemical and radioactive substances (they experimented with them as well)—were dumped directly into Lake Ladoga.

There is information to the effect that in the summer of 1960 there was a depot of old chemical bombs in the forest near the village of Koporye on the shore of the Gulf of Finland. The area of the depot was 4 square kilometers. The structures there were already beginning

to leak. And then some of them were shot up so that the toxic agents could flow out into trenches. Where did this chemical death go and what underground layers were infiltrated? But the largest part of the bombs was removed somewhere within a year. Where to?

As was learned from Viktor Konstantinovich Ryzhkov, chief of the St. Petersburg specialized state inspectorate for the conservation of the sea and adjacent waterways of the region, there are three places in the Gulf of Finland where munitions have been dumped. Ryzhkov inquired about this at the command of our naval base. The acting Chief of Staff Skrypnik answered that one such place is located to the north of the Island of Nerva, another is to the north of Tolbukhin Lighthouse, and a third is to the northeast of this same lighthouse. Precise coordinates are in IZVESHCHENIYE MOREPLAVATELYAM NA BALTIYSKOM MORE, No 2, 7 January 1982. There was one phrase in the response from Skrypnik that was particularly displeasing to Ryzhkov: "The Leningrad Naval Base has no information on the time of the burial or its volumes and characteristics."

Our Finnish neighbors should remember the coordinates of the dump near the Island of Nerva—this is 17 km from the national sea boundary, latitude 60 degrees 17 minutes, longitude 27 degrees 57 minutes, and the depth there is from 46 to 58 meters.

The workers of the military-chemical complex created weapons and believed that the Motherland needs this. The generals received decorations, and now they have found warm places and are dealing with "ecology" and "conventional problems." And the generals will never tell the truth: where and what weapons did they bury, develop, and dump. For this reason, I appeal to those who can divert a chemical Chernobyl from our home and to those who remember and understand. I implore you to respond! Before it is too late, it is necessary to draw up a chart of where chemical death lies in wait of its hour "X."

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Possible Asian Security Structure Viewed

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[Article by Dmitriy Kosyrev, diplomatic correspondent: "Asian Security System: A Fine but Ephemeral Plan"]

[Text] In the most diplomatic terms, the proposal states the need for a new structure to safeguard the security of the whole Asian-Pacific region (APR). This is a proposal which is near completion and which the Clinton administration intends to submit to Japan and other states of the APR, according to YOMIURI. That newspaper reports that the Americans will be proposing an eastern version of the Conference on Security and Cooperation

in Europe—something like a regularly convened conference, where all of the Asian states will settle all possible conflicts and misunderstandings.

The idea has also been stated more bluntly by Caspar Weinberger, former U.S. secretary of defense. He has suggested that the idea of a conference should be scrapped in favor of an Asian NATO—for united defense against China, which is rapidly gaining strength.

I cannot definitely say that these are two sides of the same coin, but let us take a look at how seriously these ideas are being taken, and how they could affect Russia, a great power in Asia.

The problem is that politicians have known for more than a decade that fine plans for Asian security are always ephemeral. It was only in Europe, after all, that there was a distinct frontline between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the years of global ideological confrontation. Everything was more complex in Asia in those years. Anyone who feels that this kind of frontline existed in Indochina should recall the genuine warfare between socialist Vietnam and China in 1979.

The fact is that the Asian countries were always able to avoid the role of "seconds" in the duel between the East and the West, the role of unconditional allies of Moscow or Washington. They always managed to play by their own rules. Now the small countries in the APR have an even better chance of settling their differences without the involvement of any superpower.

In today's APR there are almost no enemies raging at each other across rows of barbed wire. The Korean peninsula is the exception, but even a conflict here is likely to remain localized, because Beijing probably would not give the Pyongyang Kim clan unconditional support today. This cartoon [not reproduced] from a Hong Kong magazine, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, is a reminder of another potentially volatile zone—the disputed Spratley archipelago in the South China Sea. It is claimed by many states. Some islands have been claimed simultaneously by China (and also, therefore, by Taiwan), Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This is a dangerous situation, but it is nevertheless an isolated problem and does not require any kind of "Asian CSCE."

This does not mean that Asia does not want an "Asian CSCE." On the contrary, the outlines of this system have been taking shape for a long time. The foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries meet every summer, for example, and these meetings are followed by dialogue with their colleagues from virtually all of the APR countries and the European Community. Representatives from the countries of Indochina, Russia, and the PRC have attended these meetings in various capacities

in the last 2 years. This also applies to the intergovernmental Asian Pacific Economic Council and non-governmental North Pacific Economic Council. All of the countries of the region are members of both of these economic organizations (Russia, however, is a member of only the second). The simple expansion of their agenda and the addition of a single line to their charter could turn them into security forums as well.

All of these spontaneously maturing plans of the Pacific organizations, however, assign the United States a role quite different from its earlier one, when it was also a military counterbalance to communism in Asia. The role of the United States in these structures is commensurate with American economic influence in the APR— influence that is certainly not negligible, but is no match for Japan's. The same is true of Russia. Judging by, for example, Aleksandr Rutskoy's recent trip to three Pacific states, Russia is seen there as a completely acceptable partner, even in the military sphere, but we have to face the facts: Russia's economic role in Asia is still incomparable to, for example, the role of Singapore.

Nevertheless, whereas Russia has a chance of acquiring influence and gradually gaining stronger influence in Asia today, now that the "cold war" is over, the United States can only lose influence. Washington's efforts to remind the Asian states of its military potential to maintain the strategic balance in the APR cannot make much of a change here.

This is the situation today and this will be the situation tomorrow. As for the day after tomorrow, the situation can only grow worse. Weinberger invoked the name "China," and this is no longer a matter of ideology but purely of economic strength. In general, the world is just beginning to realize what kind of giant China has become. According to the statistics of the previously mentioned North Pacific Economic Council, the PRC economy displayed a growth rate of 12 percent last year, and the anticipated rates for this year and the next are 10.1 percent and 9.5 percent. These are record rates, and considering the country's present proportions and its potential in general....

Does this mean that the United States—in line with Weinberger's views—has to compensate for the anticipated augmentation of China's role in Asia by holding on to its gradually disappearing military influence in the region? Does this mean that members of the Clinton cabinet are suggesting the same thing in hushed tones? Finally, should we expect Russia to eventually have to take a stand with the United States against China or with China against the United States in its Pacific policy? If I had to make the decision, I would choose China, for geographic and economic reasons, not to mention the fact that friendly relations with Beijing are already useful in normal economic operations in the APR today. It would be best, however, if we did not have to make a choice; it would be best if Weinberger's comments could remain the dissenting opinion of a single individual.

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